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Abstract
Using a cross-country quarterly firm-level dataset, we empirically examine the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the trade credit channel of firms. In contrast
to the impact on trade credit documented during earlier crisis episodes, we find that
firms with poor credit quality obtain lower amounts of trade credit from their sup-
plier firms during the quarters following the COVID-19 outbreak. The findings
suggest that less creditworthy firms are credit rationed by their suppliers during a
product market crisis, in contrast to the credit substitution documented between
formal financial institutions and suppliers during a credit market crisis. Further-
more, we document that firms with better growth prospects and firms with better
stakeholder relationships are able to obtain trade credit in the post-pandemic pe-
riod, despite their poor creditworthiness. Our empirical analysis supports the view
that supplier financing is conditional on the product market conditions and is not
always a generous substitute for bank credit.
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1. Introduction
The spread of COVID-19 proved to be a macroeconomic shock to the economy world-
wide (Altig et al., 2020). Most of the countries imposed strict lockdowns, encouraged
remote working, and enforced social distancing norms to curtail the transmission of in-
fectious coronavirus (Hale, Petherick, Phillips, & Webster, 2020; Moosa, 2020). The
lockdown period proved to be the worst downturn in the economy after the great depres-
sion (Gopinath, 2020). On one hand, the abrupt pandemic-induced uncertainty affected
the demand for products and services, especially the discretionary items. On the other
hand, the containment measures affected the global supply chains adversely (Boissay, Pa-
tel, & Shin, 2020). Taken together, the impact of the subdued demand and the disrupted
supply chains significantly affected the firms around the world.
Based on the early capital market reaction during the onset of the pandemic, several
studies documented that inflexible firms, which are financially constrained and oper-
ationally vulnerable, are more likely to be impacted adversely during the COVID-19
period (Ding, Levine, Lin, & Xie, 2021; Ramelli & Wagner, 2020). One of the promi-
nent factors that determine the flexibility of a firm is the ability to optimally manage
its working capital. In our study, we explore the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
the trade financing obtained by firms from their suppliers. Specifically, we ask whether
firms with higher creditworthiness, better stakeholder relationships, and growth options
disproportionately obtained valuable alternative financing resources from their suppliers
during the pandemic.1
There are two separate, yet complementary, views on trade credit financing obtained
by firms. One view argues that trade credit substitutes for bank credit for firms facing
financing trouble; ex-ante riskier firms would obtain trade credit in the absence of bank
credit as the suppliers prefer to increase their sales by offering products on credit (Fisman
& Love, 2003; Love, Preve, & Sarria-Allende, 2007; Meltzer, 1960). Schwartz (1974)
argues that suppliers enjoy a financing advantage given their better monitoring ability
1As per BIS estimates, non-financial corporations provide 70% of the overall trade credit supply
(in-kind financing or alternative financing) in the economy (Boissay et al., 2020).
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and information advantage over the institutional creditors. According to the second view,
however, trade credit financing is obtained by creditworthy firms (Petersen & Rajan,
1997). Even when the suppliers choose to extend trade credit to firms with poor credit
quality, it is provided to the borrower firms with growth options and firms that maintain
better relationships with their suppliers (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). Despite the suspect
credit quality of the borrower firms, suppliers tend to finance firms with better prospects
given the implicit stake in the present value of the future profits from maintaining supply.
The COVID-19 pandemic offers a unique setting to examine how the supply of trade
credit is impacted during a crisis that emanates from the real sector, which is radically
different to a crisis that emanates from financing difficulties such as the global finan-
cial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 (Didier, Huneeus, Larrain, & Schmukler, 2021). The rapid
monetary and fiscal support measures undertaken by most of the major developed and
developing economies ensured to mount a credible response to channel credit during the
pandemic (Hofmann, Shim, Shin, et al., 2020). For instance, Demir and Javorcik (2020)
show that trade credit obtained from banks was much more resilient than other sources
of trade financing during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In such a context, rely-
ing on the exogenous COVID-19 pandemic-induced real sector shock and the associated
disruptions to economic activity, we test the arguments put forth by Petersen and Rajan
(1997) on trade credit supply. We posit that ex-ante riskier firms obtain lesser support
from their suppliers during the COVID-19 crisis period. Furthermore, we posit that, de-
spite the suspect credit quality, firms with better growth opportunities and stakeholder
relationships are able to obtain trade credit.
Given the rapidity of the pandemic-induced disruptions and the consequent responses
by most of the countries, we examine the impact on trade credit—defined as the accounts
payable of a firm scaled by its assets in our study—with cross-country firm-level quarterly
data. As we attempt to explain the characteristics of firms that are able to obtain
trade credit from their suppliers during the pandemic, it is imperative to disentangle
the supply and the demand side factors that contribute to the trade credit channel.
For instance, given the sudden decline in economic activity, it is likely that the average
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working capital requirement comes down for firms. As the COVID-19 disrupted the
global supply chains, it is likely that the supplies to a particular industry are affected
disproportionately. Hence, in our study, we control for the demand-side and supply-side
factors with the help of dummies that capture unobserved heterogeneity at various levels
of aggregation. We incorporate country-industry-year-quarter dummies that control for
trade credit demand due to industry-specific quarterly shocks at the country level. The
highly saturated model also controls for other unobserved heterogeneity, which doesn’t
vary with time and is specific to a country, industry, or firm. In addition, we control for
other observable demand-side factors such as sales, which contribute to demand-driven
fluctuations in obtaining trade credit, and control for supply-side factors such as the level
of leverage, which captures the debt capacity and the potential substitution between
trade credit and bank credit.
The key findings of our empirical analysis that employs a difference-in-differences
model are as follows. First, conforming to the arguments that supplier firms extend trade
credit to creditworthy firms, we find evidence that firms with lower default probability
have obtained substantially higher trade credit during the post-COVID-19 period. The
riskier firms obtain about 0.3 percentage points lower trade credit, which is about 5%
of the accounts payable for the median firm in our sample, in the post-pandemic period
compared to the pre-pandemic period. Unlike earlier studies that document an increase
in trade credit reliance for riskier firms during crisis episodes, we find that less risky
firms have managed to obtain alternative sources of financing during the post-COVID-19
period.
Interestingly, and in contrast to our baseline findings, the estimations for the same
sample of firms during the GFC period yields the opposite result. The findings for the
GFC period corroborate the evidence supporting the financing constraint view of trade
credit (Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, & Udell, 2016; Casey & O’Toole, 2014).
We find that riskier firms obtained 0.43 percentage points higher trade credit during the
GFC period. Given that the pandemic-induced crisis was a real sector shock rather than
a shock to the credit markets—for instance, ted spread, a measure of global liquidity
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risk and confidence in credit markets was several times higher during the peak of the
GFC relative to the COVID-19 period—we are able to demonstrate that the trade credit
channel is not similar across crisis episodes.2
What could potentially explain the contrasting results that we document? It is likely
explained by bridging the arguments put forth by Cunat (2007), Schwartz (1974), and
Petersen and Rajan (1997). Trade credit supply is conditional on a forward-looking future
value of relationships between the borrowing firm and its supplier. The advantage that
supplier draws from extending credit includes the threat of cutting off future supplies,
reliable information on the order book of the borrowing firms, and the higher salvage of
goods that are supplied in the event of a default. During a real-sector crisis that affects
the demand for products, the above advantages enjoyed by the supplier are adversely
affected. However, in the event of a credit crisis, which may only have a spillover impact
on the demand side, the supplier could still finance the customer firm on the expectation
of future prospects.
A counterfactual explanation for the trade credit rationing observed in our study
could be the generous amount of credit available from banks and credit markets for firms
with suspect credit quality, which is a potential reverse substitution. However, we find
that the firms with poor creditworthiness also faced rationing from the lenders in the
post-COVID-19 period. Both the parallel trends and the regression estimation results
support this view. Therefore, we are able to draw a causal inference that trade credit is
potentially not a generous substitute for bank credit during product market disruptions,
especially for firms with poor credit quality.
Second, we find that riskier firms with higher contemporaneous growth are able to
obtain greater trade credit from their suppliers. Firms with higher sales growth during the
post-COVID-19 period obtain 0.38 percentage points higher net accounts payable, even
when their credit standing is suspect. Moreover, firms in industries that are less capital
intensive obtain higher trade credit (about 0.36 percentage points) compared to those
2A comparison of the GDP growth and ted spread across the two crisis episodes are shown in
Figure A2.
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in capital intensive industries. Alfaro, Chari, Greenland, and Schott (2020) argue that
capital intensive firms are more prone to the COVID-19 induced disruptions compared to
labour-intensive sectors, given the amenability of labour to remote working and mobility.
The findings suggest that suppliers do value the promise of current as well as future
prospects while evaluating firms with higher default probability.
Third, we find that riskier firms with better stakeholder relationships are able to
obtain greater amounts of trade credit. Riskier firms with higher ESG scores obtain 0.04
percentage points higher trade financing from their suppliers compared to riskier firms
with lower ESG scores. The finding provides evidence to the argument that maintaining
good relationships with the stakeholders prove to be helpful during the crises period. The
findings are further strengthened with our analysis involving the social score of firms. We
find that riskier firms with higher social scores obtain higher trade credit in the post-
COVID-19 period compared to the riskier firms with lower social scores.
These findings can be situated in the stakeholder engagement theory. According to
stakeholder engagement theory, the success of firms depends on satisfying the expectations
of different stakeholders of firms (Freeman, 1984). The theory also suggests that higher
CSR activities signify the commitment of firms to different stakeholders on a trust and
cooperation basis. Jones (1995) show that the firms that maintain a relationship with
their stakeholders on a trust and cooperation basis experience lesser agency costs. Our
findings corroborate the findings documented by Zhang, Lara, and Tribó (2020) on the
importance of social responsibility and trade credit supply. Furthermore, the improved
social performance of firms helps firms in decreasing operational risks. It also helps
firms that are more prone to negative shocks by generating positive moral capital among
stakeholders of the firms. Consequently, the riskier firms with better stakeholder relations
are able to obtain higher trade credit during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The credit rationing faced by the firms with suspect credit quality is moderated if
the product market conditions are favourable or if the firms have maintained good re-
lationships with their stakeholders. Taken together, the moderating effect of growth
opportunities and the stakeholder relationship on the trade credit supply to riskier firms
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suggest that trade credit is conditional on the product market conditions, and is ‘not’ a
generous substitute to bank credit.
Our findings are robust to several alternative estimations. First, we test the results
with an alternative proxy for firm risk and find that our baseline results are largely
unaffected. We complement this test with an alternative estimation that categorizes the
firms based on their financial constraints and find consistent results. Second, we test
whether our findings hold if we remove Japan and the United States, two countries with
a higher proportion of firms in our sample. Our major findings with the sub-sample of
firms from countries other than US and Japan are consistent with the baseline results.
Third, we do a placebo test with an artificially induced crisis in a normal period. We
find that there is no significant difference in the trade credit reliance of firms grouped by
their creditworthiness. Overall, the results of the robustness tests strengthen the baseline
results.
Our study deepens the understanding of the impact of real sector shocks on trade
credit in the following ways. First, we are able to unearth some of the pandemic-specific
channels that affect the trade credit financing obtained by firms in a cross-country setting.
Unlike earlier studies that document the impact on trade credit channels during the crisis
episodes, our study presents alternative evidence in view of a crisis that largely affected
the demand-side and the operations of firms across countries. Second, the cross-country
data allows us to provide external validity—empirical analysis that provides generaliz-
able results—compared to the internal validity of single-country studies. However, the
cross-country setting also limits our identification of supply-side factors such as the char-
acteristics of supplier firms given the paucity of data at a cross-country level.
Third, while Petersen and Rajan (1997) find empirical support using cross-sectional
data from the US, we document the impact of product market shocks on trade credit
using cross-country panel data. While the majority of the studies have found support
in favour of the substitution view of trade credit (see, for instance, Adelino, Ferreira,
Giannetti, & Pires, 2020), to our knowledge, this is the first study that lends support
to the importance of the product market in the trade credit transmission channel in a
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cross-country setting.
Our study can be situated in the following strands of literature. First, our analysis
complements the studies on the impact of crisis episodes on the supply of trade credit. For
example, Casey and O’Toole (2014), Bastos and Pindado (2013), and Lin and Chou (2015)
find that credit-constrained and less creditworthy firms obtain higher trade credit during
the global financial crisis period. Trade credit from suppliers lends a ‘helping hand’ for the
credit-constrained firms to mitigate the negative shocks of financial crises (Nilsen, 2002;
Wilner, 2000). A similar finding is documented for small firms and credit-constrained
firms during the financial crisis of 2008-09 (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2016; McGuinness &
Hogan, 2016). In another set of studies, Love and Zaidi (2010) and Love et al. (2007) find
support for the substitution hypothesis of trade credit only in the initial crisis period.
They show that financially weaker firms receive and extend less trade credit in the period
following the financial crises, supporting the re-distributional view of trade credit.
Second, we contribute to the increasing literature on the effect of COVID-19-induced
disruptions on firm performance. Ding et al. (2021) study the impact of firm character-
istics on returns during the COVID-19 period. They show that firms with better ex-ante
financial conditions experience higher returns. Additionally, firms involved in Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) activities are more resilient to the COVID-19 shocks (Albu-
querque, Koskinen, Yang, & Zhang, 2020; Didier et al., 2021; Ding et al., 2021). Firms
with greater financial and operational flexibility, for instance, higher cash holdings, had
higher market capitalization during the pandemic period (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020). Di-
dier et al. (2021) show that firms with lower insolvency and default risk outperform the
inefficient firms in the pandemic period.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we describe
the methodology and data used in our study. Next, we discuss the key findings of our
study. The subsequent section provides an analysis of the robustness tests. The final
section concludes with some potential insights for policymakers.
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2. Methodology & Data
2.1. Methodology
2.1.1. Trade credit during COVID-19
This section describes the methodology employed in our study to estimate the impact of
COVID-19 on the trade credit obtained by firms. We employ a difference-in-differences
(DiD) method to test the hypothesis on the effect of product market shock on firms
classified based on their creditworthiness. We employ cross-country quarterly firm-level
panel data in the study that helps in improving the external validity of the estimation
results. The estimation equation employed in our baseline model is as follows:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 Xi,t−4 × COV ID − 19t ++β2 Xi,t−4 + β3 Zi,t−1 +δi + αcjt + ǫit (1)
In Equation 1, Y represents the dependent variable that captures the trade credit
obtained by firms in our study. We employ Payables and Net payables as our dependent
variables. Here, Payables is defined as the accounts payable scaled by total assets of
the firm (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). Net payables equals the difference between accounts
payable and accounts receivable of a firm scaled by total assets of the firm ((Accounts
payable- Accounts receivable)/Total assets).
The main explanatory variable in the estimation equation is Xi × COV ID − 19
where X is a dummy variable (High default) that takes the value of 1 for firms with a
probability of default (PD) above the median PD and 0 otherwise. The PD measure is
the ex-ante default probability, which is lagged by a year (4 quarters), to avoid potential
reverse causality concerns. The default probability of a firm is sensitive to the changes in
short-term liabilities such as trade credit during COVID-19 (Bureau, Duquerroy, & Vinas,
2021). COVID-19 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-pandemic
period and 0 otherwise. Z represents a vector of quarterly firm-level control variables
that are commonly employed in the literature on trade credit. Z includes Liquidity,
Profitability, Leverage and Size of the firms. All the control variables are lagged by one
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quarter to reduce potential endogeneity concerns. Table 1 shows the description of all the
variables employed in the study. The event window for the DiD estimation as shown in
Equation 1 spans 16 quarters starting from Q1’2017 until Q4’2020. The pre-COVID-19
the event window is from Q1’2017 to Q1’2020 and the post-COVID-19 period is from
Q2’2020 to Q4’2020.
δi represents the firm fixed effects for a firm i to control for firm-specific unobserved
heterogeneity. We also control for any industry-specific effects varying over time at the
country-industry-year-quarter level by αcjt where c, j, and t represents country, industry
and year-quarter respectively. The interaction term captures the unobserved time-varying
effects at the country-level and industry-level in isolation as well as at the country-
industry level. Moreover, the year-quarter effects, which are any common shocks at a
quarterly frequency, are also subsumed in the αcjt term. The highly saturated interaction
term helps us reduce potential biases caused by omitted variables (for details, see Gormley
and Matsa (2014)).
It is likely that the interventions and response measures undertaken by various govern-
ments encourage the supplier firms to provide generous credit to the borrower firms. Such
policy interventions—undertaken during the post-COVID-19 period—may confound the
effects that we examine in the study. Therefore, the interactive fixed effects (country-
industry-year-quarter) employed in our study, which is similar to those employed in recent
empirical studies in corporate finance (see for instance, Degryse, De Jonghe, Jakovljević,
Mulier, & Schepens, 2019, and Gopalakrishnan, Jacob, and Mohapatra (2021)) , help
us control for such unobserved time-invariant and variant heterogeneity at the country
and the industry level. Overall, we believe that the saturated fixed effects help in better
identification of the impact of COVID-19 shocks on the trade credit channel of firms.
2.1.2. Role of growth opportunities and stakeholder relationships on trade credit
In this section, we describe the methodology employed to estimate whether factors such
as growth opportunities and stakeholder relationships affect the differential impact of
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COVID-19 on trade credit obtained by firms.
Yi,t = β0 + β1 Xi,t−4 × COV ID − 19t ×Mi,t−1 + β2 Xi,t−4 ×Mi,t−1
+ β3 COV ID − 19t ×Mi,t−1 + β4 COV ID − 19t ×Xi,t−4
+ β5 Zi,t−1 +δi + αcjt + ǫit
(2)
In Equation 2, the dependent variable Y, the explanatory variable X, COVID-19, and
Z are the same as defined earlier. M refers to the variables that could moderate the
impact of COVID-19 shock on the trade credit supply obtained to firms classified based
on their creditworthiness. We explore two sets of moderators variables that affect the
supply of trade credit to firms (Petersen & Rajan, 1997), the product market growth
opportunities of firms and the stakeholder relationships maintained by the firms. For the
growth opportunities, we employ two variables: Sales growth median, which is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with a sale growth that is above the median
sales growth in the estimation sample in a quarter; and Manufacturing, which is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to SIC industrial classification for the
manufacturing sector and 0 otherwise. To estimate the moderating impact of stakeholder
relationship on the trade credit channel, we employ ESG score and Social score.
2.2. Data
We collect data for our study from the Refinitiv Eikon database and the Credit Research
Initiative (CRI) database. The financial variables, as well as variables used for determin-
ing stakeholder relationship (ESG score & Social score), are obtained from Refinitiv Eikon
database. The probability of default (PD) of firms, which captures the creditworthiness
of firms, is obtained from the CRI database maintained by the National University of
Singapore. The CRI database provides the one-year default probability at a monthly
level. Several recent studies in the finance literature have employed this data (Bai &
Wu, 2016; Li, Lu, & Srinivasan, 2019; Subrahmanyam, Tang, & Wang, 2014). As the
financial variables are varying at a quarterly frequency, we estimate the average PD at
the quarterly level. We exclude all financial firms (SIC 60 to 67) from our study. The
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final estimation sample after accounting for the availability of the key estimation vari-
ables contains 87,986 firm-quarter observations, which comprise 7,406 unique firms from
a total of 58 countries.
In our study, we utilize a panel data of firm-level quarterly financial information,
which spans from 2017 to 2020, to estimate the impact of COVID-19 on the relationship
between creditworthiness and trade credit channel of firms. The treated variable in our
estimations is the ex-ante creditworthiness of firms, which is proxied by the PD of firms
(Duan, Sun, & Wang, 2012; Duan, Wang, et al., 2012). PD is defined as the likelihood
that a debtor is unable to honor its financial obligations in the coming year. In our study,
we take the median value of the probability of default of firms to identify the firms with
high default rates and low default rates. High default equals 1 for the above-median
probability of default of firms and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variables employed in our study are payables and net payables. Payables
equals accounts payable scaled by total assets and net payables equal the difference be-
tween accounts payable and accounts receivable scaled by the total assets of the firm. The
accounts payable is defined as the amounts owed to the suppliers for goods purchased
or services obtained to carry out the normal operations of the business. The accounts
receivable is defined as the total value of dues against customers for goods sold or services
accomplished during the normal course of business.
The control variables employed in our study are liquidity, profitability, leverage, and
size of firms. Here, Liquidity is defined as cash & cash equivalents of a firm scaled by
total assets of the firm. Profitability equals the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets of the firm. Leverage equals the debt-
to-equity ratio of the firm. We employ the total revenues of the firm as the proxy for firm
size. A detailed description of the variables is shown in Table 1.
Furthermore, to estimate the role of stakeholder relationships on the trade credit ob-
tained by firms during the COVID-19 period, we employ the ESG score and Social score
of firms as a proxy for stakeholder relationship. ESG score is defined as the company’s
overall score based on environmental score (firm’s impact on the natural systems), social
11
score (firm’s capacity of generating trust among stakeholders across the value chain) and
governance score (firm’s systems and processes to act in the best interests of its share-
holders). It is an indicator of management competence and non-financial performance of
firms. Social score reflects the capacity of a firm to generate trust and loyalty among its
stakeholders by implying the best management practices. It is considered as the firm’s
ability to increase shareholders value and build reputation among its stakeholders.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of key variables used in the study. The average
firm in our sample has accounts payable of 8.85%. The average value of net payables is
−3.69%, which shows that the average firm in our sample has a net credit outstanding
from its customers. A summary of the within-country variation in both payables and net
payables is shown in Figure A1. The probability of default of the average firm in our
sample is 0.32%, which is the default probability of firms categorized as A or investment
grade by the major rating agencies. The average Altman Z score of firms in our sample
is 3.28, which indicates that the chances of insolvency in the next year for the average
firm is minimal. The average value of the KZ index is −18.60 indicating that the average
firm is not financially constrained.
The average value of the ESG score for the firms in our sample is 41.38 and the social
score is 42.98. The average firm in our sample has 16% of cash and marketable securities
as a proportion of its assets. The average firm is profitable (2%) and has a leverage
ratioof 0.74. The average sales growth of firms is 5% and more than half of our sample
(54%) comprise of firms in the manufacturing sector.
2.3. Univariate trends
Figure 1 shows the trend of average payables and average net payables in the pre-COVID-
19 and post-COVID-19 period for the last two years. The top panel shows that there is a
sharp decline in average payables after the declaration of COVID-19 as the pandemic. It
is likely that, on average, firms obtained lower amounts of trade credit due to the muted
demand—which was induced by the government restriction to contain the virus—and the
consequent supply requirements. The bottom panel shows that despite the decrease in
12
average payables during the pandemic, the average net payables increased in the post-
COVID-19 period.
The parallel trends of average payables and average net payables during the COVID-
19 period and the GFC period is shown in Figure 2. The top panel, which shows the
trend during the COVID-19 period, suggests that the average payables for firms in the
high default category has declined during the post-COVID-19 period. However, despite
an initial decline, the average payables for the firms in the low default category has risen
to the pre-COVID-19 levels. The bottom panel, which shows the trend during the GFC
period, suggests that, while there is an overall decline, the riskier firms obtained higher
payables relative to the less risky firms. Similarly, the net payables are considerably
higher for the riskier firms compared to the less risky firms in the post-GFC period. This
is consistent with the findings of Love et al. (2007) who show that trade credit increased
in riskier firms during crises period.
Figure 3 shows the parallel trend of average payables for firms classified based on
high and low creditworthiness and high and low contemporaneous growth. As indicated
in the top panel, the manufacturing firms with low creditworthiness has lower payables
in the post-COVID-19 period compared to the riskier firms in the services sector. It is
likely that the manufacturing firms become even riskier during the pandemic because
of the operational disruptions caused by COVID-19 (Alfaro et al., 2020). The trends
in the bottom panel indicate that the riskier firms with high sales growth continue to
obtain higher payables relative to riskier firms with low sales growth. Suppliers prefer
to overlook the suspect credit quality when the firms have growth opportunities and,
consequently, such firms obtain higher trade credit (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). For a
similar classification of firms based on their creditworthiness and growth opportunities,
Figure 4 shows the parallel trends for average net payables. The pattern is similar to
that of average payables of growth firms.
Figure 5 shows the parallel trend of average payables for firms classified based on
high and low creditworthiness and high and low stakeholder relationship. Stakeholder
relationships of firms are captured using the ESG score (top panel) and social score
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(bottom panel). The top panel of Figure 5 shows that riskier firms with high ESG scores,
relative to firms with low ESG scores, continue to obtain trade credit during COVID-19.
The second panel also shows the same pattern. The riskier firms with high social scores
show a stable pattern in the average payables obtained in the post-COVID-19 period
compared to firms with low social scores, which shows a declining trend. Similarly,
Figure 6 shows the parallel trend of net payables for the same set of firm classification.
The parallel trends in Figure 6 strongly indicate that, despite the poor credit quality,
firms with better relationship scores are able to obtain considerably higher amounts of
trade credit in the post-pandemic period relative to similar firms with lower relationship
scores.
Overall, the univariate trends support our key hypothesis that the riskier firms have
been rationed of valuable supplier credit during the COVID-19 period. Only those firms
with better growth opportunities and those firms with better stakeholder relationships
obtain higher supplier financing despite the weaker credit profiles. However, the results
from the univariate trends are at best indicative and don’t help us to draw any inference
on the causes of the change in trade credit supply in the post-COVID-19 period. In the
next section, we analyze whether the indicative trends hold up in a regression framework
that controls for other factors that could affect the trade credit supply to firms.
3. Results and Discussion
In this section, we estimate Equation 1 and Equation 2 and discuss the key findings of the
regressions results. First, we discuss the estimation results of the impact of COVID-19
on trade credit obtained by firms. Next, we discuss the results of the estimations that
analyze the moderating impact of growth opportunities and stakeholder relationships.
3.1. Impact of COVID-19 on trade credit
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline estimation as described in Equation 1. Columns
(1) to (4) present the estimation results for the COVID-19 period. The first two columns
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presents the estimation results with accounts payable as the dependent variable and
columns (3) and (4) present the results with net payables as the dependent variable.
Columns (1) and (3) show the estimations without the control variables and columns (2)
and (4) show the estimation results with the firm-level control variables. The coefficient
of High default × COVID-19 is consistently negative across all estimations. The results
suggest that riskier firms—categorized as high default—obtained lower supplier financing
(by about 0.27%) in the post-COVID-19 period relative to the pre-COVID-19 period.
Even after controlling for the firm-level variables, our results show that payables obtained
by high default firms declined by 0.24% in the post-pandemic period. Columns (3) &
(4) of Table 3 show that net payables of high default firms reduced by 0.29% and 0.31%
respectively. The post-COVID-19 reduction observed for firms with poor creditworthiness
is about 5% of the accounts payable of the average firm in our sample.
Next, we re-estimate Equation 1 for the same set of firms during the GFC. The GFC
sample period starts from Q1’2005 to Q1’2009. The crisis period starts from the third
quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. This period was considered in earlier studies
to study the effect of GFC on trade credit (Coulibaly, Sapriza, & Zlate, 2013). We
employ a dummy variable, GFC dum, which takes the value of 1 for the crisis period and
0 otherwise. The results of the re-estimations are shown in columns (5)-(8). In contrast
to the results observed during the COVID-19 period, columns (5) & (6) show that trade
credit obtained by high default firms increased by 0.43% and 0.57% respectively during
the GFC period. However, the results for net payables as the dependent variable during
GFC period is not significant.
Taken together, the results suggest that trade credit is not always a generous sub-
stitute to bank credit. Unlike the credit substitution observed during GFC period, less
creditworthy firms have faced credit rationing from their suppliers in the post-pandemic
period. This finding is consistent with the argument of Petersen and Rajan (1997) that
the creditworthiness of the borrower firms is one of the key determinants of trade credit
supply. Moreover, the higher trade credit obtained by firms with better credit quality
demonstrates the market power of such firms to obtain payables from their suppliers even
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during risky times such as the pandemic (Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2012).
Our findings, which are in contrast to the impact of previous crises episodes on the
supply of trade credit, buttress the view that trade credit supply is conditional on the
product market conditions. During a real sector shock that affects the entire value chain,
suppliers are likely to be cautious and selective in their choice of firms to extend credit.
The financing advantage enjoyed by the suppliers over the formal institutions as a result
of the transaction frequency, salvage value of assets and potential market power of the
suppliers (Schwartz, 1974) are negatively impacted during a real sector shock. As a
consequence, the suppliers are reluctant to extend trade credit to riskier firms. This
finding contrasts the results of Love et al. (2007) who find that trade credit acts as
a substitute for firms facing financial constraints during crises period. However, our
findings related to the GFC period are consistent with the findings of Love et al. (2007).
Our results show that trade credit does not act as a substitute for firms across all types
of crises.
3.2. Impact of growth opportunities on trade credit during COVID-19
In this section, we analyze whether the growth opportunities moderate the impact of
COVID-19 on less creditworthy firms. If supplier financing is conditional on the product
market opportunities of firms, then firms, despite their poor credit quality, would obtain
financing from their suppliers.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for Equation 2 with growth opportunities as
the moderating variable. We employ two proxies for growth opportunities: (a) the
sales growth of the firms (estimation results shown in columns (1) and (3)) and (b)
firms amenable to continuing operations during COVID-19 (estimation results shown in
columns (2) and (4)). Both columns (1) and (2) employ payables scaled by total assets
as the dependent variable, whereas, columns (3) and (4) employ net payables scaled by
total assets as the dependent variable. The results suggest that net payables increased by
0.37% for riskier firms with higher sales growth. However, we do not observe a statistically
significant impact on the payables of such firms in the post-COVID-19 period.
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Next, we find that riskier firms in the services sector, which are less capital intensive
and more amenable to flexible operational requirements (Alfaro et al., 2020), have ob-
tained 0.35% higher trade credit in the post-COVID-19 period compared to riskier firms
operating in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, the net payables of the riskier firms
in the services sector has increased by 0.53% in the post-pandemic period compared to
the riskier firms in the manufacturing sector.
Overall, our findings are in line with the results of Petersen and Rajan (1997) who
show that suppliers are willing to extend trade credit to firms with higher sales growth.
By participating in the growth opportunities of such firms, suppliers have an implicit stake
in its future growth options (Cunat, 2007; Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Wilson & Summers,
2002).
3.3. Impact of stakeholder relationships on trade credit during COVID-19
Table 5 shows the estimation results for how stakeholder relationship mitigates the rela-
tionship between trade credit and high default firms during the COVID-19 period. We
use ESG score and Social score of firms as the proxies for stakeholder relationships of
firms. The dependent variable of the estimation results shown in columns (1)-(2) and
columns (3)-(4) is accounts payable scaled by total assets and net payables scaled by total
assets respectively. Our results show that maintaining good relationships with stakehold-
ers positively moderates the relationship between high default firms and the trade credit
obtained by such firms in the post-pandemic period.
The results suggest that a one-unit increase in the ESG score results in obtaining
0.03% higher payables by riskier firms during the COVID-19 period. Moreover, it also
results in an increment of 0.06% in the net payables of riskier firms in the post-COVID-
19 period. Furthermore, the estimation results also show that a one-unit increase in the
firm’s social score results in obtaining 0.03% higher trade credit by riskier firms during the
COVID-19 period. However, it does not have any significant impact on the net payables
of high default firms in the post-pandemic period.
Altogether, the riskier firms with good stakeholder relationships are able to obtain
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more trade credit during COVID-19. The higher ESG score of firms acts as a signal for
the firms’ stakeholders and reduces information asymmetry. The stronger relationships
maintained by a firm with its stakeholders signal that the firm is socially responsible and,
consequently, builds a reputation among suppliers (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Zerbini,
2017; Zhang, Ma, Su, & Zhang, 2014). Previous studies show that trust and reputation
are the two mechanisms that ensure the trade credit contracts are sustainable (Hilary &
Huang, 2015; Karlan, 2005; Levine, Lin, & Xie, 2018).3 Specifically, Zerbini (2017) and
Zhang et al. (2020) find that better stakeholder relationships help firms in obtaining trade
credit from suppliers. It is likely that the adverse impact of higher riskiness of firms is
positively mitigated by the socially responsible behaviour of firms, which, in turn, helps
in obtaining higher trade credit in the post-COVID-19 period. Hence, our results on the
moderating effect of better relationships on trade credit obtained by riskier firms during
COVID-19 complements the findings in the literature.
4. Alternative estimations and robustness tests
In this section, we re-estimate the results based on Equation 1 and Equation 2 with various
additional tests. First, we repeat our baseline estimation with debt growth of firms as the
dependent variable to check whether our results are driven by reverse substitution effect
between bank credit and trade credit. Second, we re-estimate our results using alternative
measures (Z score median and KZ index median) for the creditworthiness of firms. Third,
we repeat our baseline estimation using stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)
DiD with no interference and variation in the treatment and control group (Rubin, 1980).
Fourth, we test whether there is a significant effect of COVID-19 on trade credit for the
firms located in emerging markets. Next, we repeat our estimation using a subsample
(excluding US and Japan) to check if our results hold without including observations
from US and Japan. Lastly, we conduct a falsification test using placebo implementation
by introducing an artificially induced crisis prior to our sample period.
3A high ESG score and social score of firms also increases the trust between firms and stakeholders
(Cheung & Pok, 2019; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017).
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4.1. Impact of COVID-19 on debt growth of firms
One of the counterfactual explanations to our results is the potential substitution of bank
credit for trade credit. If riskier firms are able to obtain generous bank credit in the post-
pandemic period, then the firms might prefer to opt for a cheaper form of bank financing
rather than the expensive trade credit from suppliers. Hence, we conduct a robustness
test using debt growth as the dependent variable to check whether there is a positive
impact on debt growth of riskier firms during the COVID-19 period.
Table 6 shows the results of our estimation with debt growth as the dependent vari-
able. The results suggest that there is no significant impact on debt growth of riskier
firms during the post-COVID-19 period relative to the pre-COVID-19 period. This fur-
ther strengthens our baseline results as the impact of COVID-19 on trade credit is not
driven by a potential reverse substitution between bank credit and trade credit. Such
a relationship is also seen in the parallel trends shown in Figure A3. The debt growth
declines for both low default firms and high default firms after the declaration of COVID-
19.
4.2. Alternative default propensity and trade credit during COVID-19
In this section, we employ an alternative proxy for the default of firms. It is likely that
the choice of treatment and control groups based on the PD measure is driving the results
rather than the hypothesized role of creditworthiness. Hence, we use Altman Z score as
a proxy of the creditworthiness of firms. We use the median value of the Altman Z score
for identifying firms with a higher and lower chance of bankruptcy. We use EBITDA,
Working Capital, Retained earnings, Market capitalisation and Revenue for calculating
the Altman Z score.4. Here, the Z score median is defined as 1 for the firms with above-
median Altman Z score and 0 otherwise.
Table 7 shows the estimation results with the Z score median as alternative default
4Based on Altman (1968), Altman Z score is measured as follows: 1.2 × Working capital/Total
assets + 1.4 × Retained earnings/Total assets + 3.3 × EBITDA/Total assets +0.6 × Market capitali-
sation/(Total assets- Book value of equity) + 0.999 × Revenue/ Total assets
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propensity. Columns (1)-(5) show the results with payables scaled by total assets as the
dependent variable and columns (6)-(10) show the results with net payables scaled by
total assets as the dependent variable. The results suggest that firms with higher Altman
Z scores (firms with better creditworthiness) were able to obtain 0.23% and 0.31% higher
payables and net payables respectively in the post-COVID-19 period. Our findings that
firms with a lesser risk of bankruptcy obtain higher trade credit during the COVID-19
period is consistent with our baseline findings.
Again, our results support the results of Cunat (2007); Petersen and Rajan (1997)
that suppliers are willing to extend credit to creditworthy buyers and they value the
promise of future prospects. These findings are consistent with our findings with High
default as a measure of the riskiness of firms. The firms with higher Altman Z scores
receive higher trade credit during the COVID-19 period as these firms are in a financially
strong position. The suppliers are also willing to extend trade credit to these firms as
they have an implicit stake in the buyers’ business in future (Cunat, 2007; Wilson &
Summers, 2002).
4.3. Financial constraints and trade credit during COVID-19
It is argued in the literature that financially constrained firms are more prone to trade
credit usage. Given the credit rationing faced by such firms from formal financial in-
stitutions, they seek more credit from their suppliers to manage their working capital
requirements. To test, whether financially constrained firms, which are less creditworthy
in other words, are credit rationed by their suppliers during COVID-19, we re-estimate
Equation 1 with KZ index as the measure of firm quality rather than PD.5. We use the
KZ index median as a proxy for firms ability to obtain financing. KZ index median is de-
fined as 1 for firms with the above-median KZ index and 0 otherwise. In the estimations,
5Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we calculate KZ index as: -1.002 × Funds from opera-
tions/lagged net PPE -39.368 × Cash dividends/lagged net PPE -1.315 × Cash and short term invest-
ments/lagged net PPE+3.139 × Leverage + 0.283 × (Market capitalisation +Total assets-Equity)/Total
assets
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we employ the KZ index median for firms with high financial constraints.
Table 8 shows the estimation results with the KZ index as a proxy for financial con-
straints. Our results shown in columns (1)-(4) are consistent with the previous findings.
The firms with a higher KZ index (lower financial constraints) obtain 0.24% and 0.29%
lower payables and net payables in the post-COVID-19 period. The results suggest that
even after controlling for other firm-level variables, the firms facing higher financial con-
straints receive lower payables during COVID-19, which is in contrast to the findings
documented during earlier crises periods.
4.4. Control for stable unit treatment of the treated group
In our estimation shown in Equation 1, we allow the treated and control groups, which are
classified into two groups based on a High default dummy, to vary with time. However, a
time-variant dummy might violate the assumption that the treated group is stable over
the estimation window, which is indicated as the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA). A model that claims no violation implies that potential outcomes for firm i
are unrelated to the treatment status of other firms in the sample (Angrist, Imbens, &
Rubin, 1996). In other words, it outlines that there is only one level of treatment, and
the treatment of one firm has no impact on other treated or control firms (Atanasov &
Black, 2016; Imbens & Rubin, 2015).
Hence, we re-estimate Equation 1 by ensuring that the treated group do not vary with
time. We classify firms into two groups based on the PD measure as of Q4’2019 for the
entire estimation window. However, we do not claim no violation based on the choice of
groups. It is likely that there are spillover effects in the post-treatment window, which is
a limitation in our study.
The estimation results are shown in columns (5) to (8) of Table 8. These results are
also consistent with the results presented in Table 3 without SUTVA. The results show
that firms with high default obtain 0.29% and 0.23% lower payables and net payables
respectively in the post-pandemic period. We assess whether COVID-19, rather than
some other shock associated with COVID-19, can explain the reduced trade credit in the
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riskier firms. Our estimation results with SUTVA independence show that external shock
like COVID-19 helps in explaining reduced trade credit in risky firms.
4.5. Impact of COVID-19 on trade credit for emerging markets
The smaller firms in the emerging markets are more likely to be dependent on trade credit
during the COVID-19 period. It is plausible that the impact of COVID-19 on trade credit
is more prominent for firms in the emerging markets compared to firms in the advanced
economies. Hence, we test whether there is a significant difference in the trade credit
obtained by high default firms in the post-COVID-19 period in the emerging economies
and advanced economies.
We define emerging economy dummy as firms located in emerging markets. These
firms are labelled as emerging economy dummy based on the classification provided by
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Emerging economy dummy equals 1 for firms located
in emerging economy and 0 otherwise. Table A2 presents the estimation results related
to emerging economies. The results suggest that there is no significant impact on trade
credit obtained by riskier firms in emerging markets. However, our results are consistent
with the baseline findings that riskier firms obtain lesser trade credit during the post-
pandemic period.
4.6. Subsample analysis
We repeat our empirical analysis using a sub-sample. We exclude the observations from
the US and Japan in the sub-sample. As shown in Table A1, these two countries have the
highest number of observations in our sample. We test whether the negative relationship
between high default firms and trade credit obtained by them during the COVID-19 holds
without including observations from the US and Japan in the sample. Table A3 shows
the results related to analysis without the observations from these two countries. Here,
the dependent variable in column (1)-(5) is payables scaled by total assets and that in
column (6)-(10) is net payables scaled by total assets. The estimation results suggest
that a one-unit increase in the riskiness of firms declines payables obtained by firms by
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0.24% in the post-pandemic period.
The riskier firms with high sales growth are able to obtain 0.25% and 0.53% higher
payables and net payables respectively in the post-pandemic period. Furthermore, the
results also suggest that net payables declined by 1.43% in the riskier manufacturing firms
during the COVID-19 period. Moreover, a one-unit increase in the ESG score and social
score of high default firms result in obtaining 0.04% and 0.03% higher payables during
COVID-19. These results are consistent with our previous findings.
4.7. Placebo estimations
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to study the impact of the riskiness of firms on obtaining
trade credit from suppliers during an artificially induced crisis period. This method has
been used in previous studies (Acharya & Xu, 2017; Atanasov & Black, 2016; Duchin,
Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010). The sample period of placebo estimation starts from 2013 to
2016, with first quarter of 2016 as the artificially induced crisis period. The last three
quarters of 2016 are considered as the post-crisis period. The selection of post-crisis
period is based on the crisis period for our baseline estimation results.
Table A4 shows the results for the placebo estimation of our study. We do not find
any significant difference in the trade credit obtained by riskier firms and creditworthy
firms during the placebo crisis except for the firms with high social scores. The estima-
tion results indicate that a one-unit increase in the social score of riskier firms helps in
obtaining 0.02% higher trade credit during the placebo crisis period. We confirm that
our results do not follow the artificially induced crisis.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of COVID-19 induced real sector crisis on the
trade credit supply obtained by firms across countries. Several studies have documented
that trade credit is a generous substitute to bank credit for financially constrained firms,
especially during earlier crisis episodes. However, we find that less creditworthy and
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financially constrained firms have obtained lower trade credit than creditworthy firms
during the post-COVID-19 period. The contrasting result in our study supports the view
that the supply of trade credit is conditional on the product market conditions, and is
not always a substitute for bank credit.
Furthermore, we document that firms with better growth opportunities—firms in
industries that are more amenable to work from home and firms with higher sales growth
during the COVID-19 crisis period—obtain higher trade credit despite the suspect credit
quality. We also find that riskier firms that maintain better stakeholder relationships
obtain higher trade credit during the post-COVID-19 period. The findings of the study
suggest that trade credit acts as a substitute for bank credit only during favourable
product market conditions. During the COVID-19 pandemic, which was characterized
both by operational disruptions and reduced demand for products and services, borrower
firms with better growth prospects have obtained valuable trade credit. Moreover, the
results are robust to several alternative estimations also.
Given the rapidity of the crisis, we employ high-frequency quarterly firm-level financial
information to examine the impact on trade credit supply. Availability of such high-
quality data is limited to larger firms that are publicly listed in the markets. Hence,
it is imperative to extend the study to include the smaller businesses to document the
extent of COVID-19 impact across the value chain. Future research studies could explore
the trade credit channel with a focus on smaller firms, either in a cross-country or a
single-country setting with richer identification of the suppliers and customers of firms.
While several policy interventions were made by governments in both advanced and
developing economies, it is important to note the disproportionate trade credit obtained
by better quality firms during the COVID-19 period. Relying on the credit transmission
for weaker firms through the banking channel or the redistribution through stronger
suppliers might prove to be less beneficial compared to direct grants and support for
such firms. Given the exogenous nature of the shock, several firms might face existential
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Figure 1: Trend of average payables and average net payables in pre-COVID-19 and
post-COVID-19 period
The figure displays the trend of average payables and average net payables for last
two years. Payables is defined as accounts payable scaled by total assets of the firm.
Net payables is defined as the difference between accounts payables and accounts
receivable scaled by total assets of a firm. The description of all variables is presented
in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Parallel trend of average payables and average net payables during COVID-19
and GFC period
The figure displays the parallel trend of average payables and average net payables
during COVID-19 and GFC period based on probability of default of firms. COVID-
19 is defined as 1 for April 2020- December 2020 and 0 otherwise. GFC is defined as
1 for July 2008- March 2009 and 0 otherwise. High default is defined as 1 for the firms
with above median probability of default. The description of all variables is presented
in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Parallel trend of average payables for growth firms
The figure displays the parallel trend of average payables for last two years for the
growth firms. The firms are classified as high default and low default based on proba-
bility of default of firms. High sales growth and non-manufacturing firms are referred
as growth firms. Manufacturing firms represents a dummy variable that is defined
as 1 for firms in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. High sales growth is
defined as 1 for firms with above median sales growth and 0 otherwise. High default
is defined as 1 for the firms with above median probability of default. The description
of all variables is presented in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Parallel trend of average net payables for growth firms
The figure displays the parallel trend of average net payables for last two years for
the growth firms. The firms are classified as high default and low default based on
probability of default of firms. High sales growth and non-manufacturing firms are
referred as growth firms. Manufacturing firms represents a dummy variable that is
defined as 1 for firms in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. High sales
growth is defined as 1 for firms with above median sales growth and 0 otherwise. High
default is defined as 1 for the firms with above median probability of default. The
description of all variables is presented in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Parallel trend of average payables according to stakeholder relationship
The figure displays the parallel trend of average payables for last two years according
to stakeholder relationship. The firms are classified as high default and low default
based on probability of default of firms. High default is defined as 1 for the firms with
above median probability of default. High ESG score represents a dummy variable
that is defined as 1 for firms with above median ESG score and 0 otherwise. High
social score represents a dummy variable that is defined as 1 for firms with above
median social score and 0 otherwise. The description of all variables is presented in
Table 1.
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Figure 6: Parallel trend of average net payables according to stakeholder relationship
The figure displays the parallel trend of average net payables for last two years ac-
cording to stakeholder relationship. The firms are classified as high default and low
default based on probability of default of firms. High default is defined as 1 for the
firms with above median probability of default. High ESG score represents a dummy
variable that is defined as 1 for firms with above median ESG score and 0 otherwise.
High social score represents a dummy variable that is defined as 1 for firms with above
median social score and 0 otherwise. The description of all variables is presented in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources
Variable Definition and construction Data source
Payables Accounts payable scaled by total assets of the firm Refinitiv Eikon
Net Payables Difference between accounts payables and accounts
receivables scaled by total assets of the firm
Refinitiv Eikon
Probability of default Likelihood that a debtor is unable to honor its fi-
nancial obligations in the coming year
Credit Research
Initiative
High default A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for firms




Altman Z score A measure based on financial ratios for calculating
the probability of a firm becoming insolvent
Refinitiv Eikon
Z score median A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for firms with
above median Altman Z score and 0 otherwise
Refinitiv Eikon
KZ index An index based on the estimation of the determi-
nants of financial constraints
Refinitiv Eikon
KZ index median A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for above
median KZ index and 0 otherwise
Refinitiv Eikon
Liquidity Cash & equivalents scaled by total assets of the
firm
Refinitiv Eikon
Profitability Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets of
the firm
Refinitiv Eikon
Leverage Debt-to-equity ratio of the firm Refinitiv Eikon
Size Total revenue of the firm Refinitiv Eikon





A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for firms in
manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise
Refinitiv Eikon
Sales growth median A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for firms
with above median sales growth and 0 otherwise
Refinitiv Eikon
ESG score Overall score based on environmental, social and
corporate governance scores
Refinitiv Eikon
Social score Capacity of a firm to generate trust and loyalty
among its stakeholders by implying the best man-
agement practices
Refinitiv Eikon
Debt growth Logarithm of debt of current quarter scaled by debt
of previous quarter
Refinitiv Eikon
Placebo A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for the arti-




A dummy variable that is defined as 1 for the




Table 2: Summary statistics of key variables
Variable N Mean SD Min P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Max
Payables (%) 87986 8.85 8.53 0.11 1.12 2.79 6.29 12.06 19.80 45.05
Net payables (%) 87986 -3.69 9.21 -77.05 -13.80 -8.05 -3.11 0.50 5.42 81.91
Probability of default (%) 87986 0.32 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.24 0.92 4.85
Altman Z score 77851 3.28 8.80 -105.71 0.56 1.02 1.76 3.31 6.62 698.38
KZ index 45117 -18.60 80.95 -627.19 -27.43 -6.92 -0.69 1.72 3.45 22.71
Manufacturing dummy 87986 0.54 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Sales growth 76294 0.05 0.46 -0.96 -0.24 -0.08 0.01 0.11 0.29 3.33
ESG score 18671 41.38 19.03 5.23 17.81 26.35 39.20 55.63 68.88 84.91
Social score 18671 42.98 22.71 2.04 14.46 24.79 40.59 59.94 75.58 93.52
COVID-19 87986 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Liquidity 74234 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.38 0.67
Profitability 80997 0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11
Leverage 80998 0.74 1.33 -3.15 0.00 0.06 0.40 0.96 1.90 8.24
Size 79111 13.04 1.95 8.39 10.56 11.68 12.95 14.43 15.67 17.66
Debt growth 63982 0.02 0.48 -10.81 -0.18 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.23 14.53
Notes: Table 1 presents the description of all the variables. N stands for the number of observations. Min. &
Max. show the minimum and maximum value of each variable respectively. SD and P represent the standard
deviation and percentile respectively.
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Table 3: Impact of COVID-19 on trade credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High default × COVID-19 -0.278*** -0.245** -0.290** -0.316**
(0.099) (0.100) (0.125) (0.128)
High default × GFC dum 0.430** 0.571** 0.733 1.055
(0.210) (0.286) (0.520) (0.788)
High default -0.021 -0.079* -0.014 -0.003 -0.042 -0.130 -0.049 -0.211
(0.046) (0.047) (0.059) (0.061) (0.100) (0.117) (0.137) (0.203)
Liquidity -2.231*** 2.649*** -3.224*** -4.462***
(0.341) (0.484) (0.723) (1.722)
Profitability -4.960*** -2.210 -12.039*** -23.273
(0.995) (1.672) (3.856) (14.256)
Leverage -0.051** 0.016 -0.110** -0.134**
(0.022) (0.033) (0.048) (0.057)
Size 1.294*** -0.176 0.586** 0.686***
(0.141) (0.194) (0.231) (0.260)
Constant 8.880*** -7.815*** -3.659*** -1.876 9.665*** 2.192 9.655*** 1.333
(0.021) (1.853) (0.027) (2.542) (0.040) (2.915) (0.045) (3.171)
Observations 87,986 69,963 87,986 69,963 40,747 27,291 40,389 27,098
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.940 0.892 0.905 0.896 0.892 0.825 0.803
Notes: The dependent variable in model (1), (2), (5) & (6) is payables scaled by total assets and (3), (4), (7) & (8) is net payables scaled by
total assets. High default is defined as 1 for firms with above median probability of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April
2020-December 2020 and 0 otherwise. GFC is defined as 1 for July 2008- March 2009 and 0 otherwise. Table 1 presents the description of all the
variables. The robust standard errors are displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is
denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table 4: Impact of growth opportunities on trade credit during COVID-19
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High default × COVID-19 × Sales growth median 0.041 0.376***
(0.113) (0.144)
COVID-19 × Sales growth median 0.143** -0.192**
(0.069) (0.091)
High default × Sales growth median 0.017 -0.086
(0.048) (0.064)
Sales growth median 0.070*** 0.042
(0.026) (0.040)
High default × COVID-19 × Manufacturing dummy -0.356* -0.535**
(0.198) (0.252)
High default × Manufacturing dummy 0.050 0.038
(0.095) (0.122)
High default × COVID-19 -0.276** -0.069 -0.475*** -0.053
(0.118) (0.154) (0.152) (0.209)
High default -0.108** -0.105* 0.073 -0.022
(0.055) (0.064) (0.075) (0.086)
Liquidity -2.013*** -2.226*** 2.861*** 2.655***
(0.380) (0.341) (0.532) (0.483)
Profitability -5.287*** -4.973*** -0.882 -2.230
(1.115) (0.994) (1.946) (1.673)
Leverage -0.036 -0.051** 0.011 0.015
(0.026) (0.022) (0.036) (0.033)
Size 1.304*** 1.293*** -0.415* -0.178
(0.154) (0.141) (0.234) (0.194)
Constant -8.057*** -7.797*** 1.295 -1.844
(2.026) (1.851) (3.077) (2.540)
Observations 60,163 69,963 60,163 69,963
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.944 0.943 0.910 0.905
Notes: The dependent variable in model (1) & (2) is payables scaled by total assets and (3) & (4)
is net payables scaled by total assets. High default is defined as 1 for firms with above median
probability of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April 2020-December 2020 and 0
otherwise. Sales growth median is defined as 1 for the firms with above median sales growth and
0 otherwise. Manufacturing dummy is defined as 1 for firms in the manufacturing industry and
0 otherwise. Table 1 presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors are
displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The significance level at 1%, 5% and
10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table 5: Impact of stakeholder relationships on trade credit during COVID-19
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High default × COVID-19 × ESG score 0.038** 0.060**
(0.018) (0.025)
COVID-19 × ESG score 0.008 -0.022**
(0.010) (0.011)
High default × ESG score 0.004 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005)
ESG score -0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
High default × COVID-19 × Social score 0.031* 0.027
(0.018) (0.024)
COVID-19 × Social score 0.007 -0.015
(0.007) (0.009)
High default × Social score 0.003 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
Social score 0.001 0.009
(0.004) (0.006)
High default × COVID-19 -1.504* -1.237 -2.367* -1.004
(0.841) (0.857) (1.222) (1.249)
High default -0.299* -0.262* 0.116 0.072
(0.163) (0.158) (0.251) (0.205)
Liquidity -1.457*** -1.446*** 1.450* 1.459*
(0.478) (0.478) (0.742) (0.747)
Profitability -1.907 -1.851 -0.980 -1.023
(2.246) (2.249) (3.234) (3.240)
Leverage -0.025 -0.025 0.087** 0.088**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.043)
Size 0.056 0.045 -0.456 -0.458
(0.332) (0.331) (0.415) (0.416)
Constant 6.805 6.818 2.469 2.362
(4.846) (4.846) (6.121) (6.133)
Observations 14,726 14,726 14,726 14,726
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.967 0.967 0.941 0.941
Notes: The dependent variable in model (1) & (2) is payables scaled by total assets and
(3) & (4) is net payables scaled by total assets. High default is defined as 1 for firms
with above median probability of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April
2020-December 2020 and 0 otherwise. ESG score refers to the overall score of a firm based
on environmental, social and corporate governance scores. Social score refers to a firm’s
capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society. Table 1
presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors are displayed in
brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is
denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table 6: Impact of COVID-19 on debt growth of firms
(1) (2)
High default × COVID-19 -0.005 -0.012
(0.013) (0.014)













Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.017
Notes: The dependent variable is debt growth. High default refers to
firms with above median probability of default. COVID-19 is defined
as 1 for the period April 2020-December 2020 and 0 otherwise. Table 1
presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors
are displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table 7: Alternative default propensity and trade credit during COVID-19
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Z score median × COVID-19 0.231** 0.175 0.051 1.358* 1.473** 0.315*** 0.332** 0.111 1.104 1.449
(0.093) (0.110) (0.147) (0.727) (0.618) (0.115) (0.138) (0.192) (1.074) (0.951)
Z score median × COVID-19 × Sales growth median 0.182* 0.015
(0.109) (0.134)
Z score median × COVID-19 × Manufacturing dummy 0.335* 0.386
(0.188) (0.235)
Z score median × COVID-19 × ESG score -0.029* -0.014
(0.017) (0.022)
Z score median × COVID-19 × Social score -0.030** -0.022
(0.012) (0.018)
Firm-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63,432 54,772 63,432 13,042 13,042 63,432 54,772 63,432 13,042 13,042
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.942 0.945 0.942 0.968 0.968 0.907 0.913 0.907 0.943 0.943
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(5) is payables scaled by total assets and column (6)-(10) is net payables scaled by total assets.
Z score median refers to firms with above median Altman Z score. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April 2020-December 2020 and 0
otherwise. Sales growth median is defined as 1 for the firms with above median sales growth and 0 otherwise. Manufacturing dummy is defined
as 1 for firms in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. ESG score refers to the overall score of a firm based on environmental, social
and corporate governance scores. Social score refers to a firm’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society.
Table 1 presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors are displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level.
The significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table 8: Impact of financial constraints on trade credit during COVID-19 and SUTVA DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
KZ index median × COVID-19 -0.242** -0.278** -0.292* -0.249
(0.123) (0.120) (0.157) (0.164)
High default × COVID-19 -0.271*** -0.294*** -0.208 -0.236*
(0.104) (0.104) (0.133) (0.137)
KZ index median 0.262*** 0.187** 0.117 0.059
(0.083) (0.080) (0.118) (0.111)
Liquidity -2.306*** 1.738*** -2.011*** 2.832***
(0.480) (0.593) (0.363) (0.519)
Profitability -5.031*** -4.227* -4.846*** -2.286
(1.505) (2.347) (1.057) (1.795)
Leverage -0.058** -0.001
(0.023) (0.034)
Size 1.336*** -0.413* 1.364*** -0.130
(0.186) (0.244) (0.153) (0.209)
Constant 8.408*** -9.026*** -3.467*** 1.857 8.720*** -8.824*** -3.665*** -2.458
(0.041) (2.486) (0.059) (3.263) (0.008) (2.011) (0.011) (2.744)
Observations 41,332 35,272 41,332 35,272 76,776 65,317 76,776 65,317
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.941 0.903 0.909 0.933 0.942 0.899 0.907
Notes: The dependent variable in model (1), (2), (5) & (6) is payables scaled by total assets and (3), (4), (7) & (8) is net payables scaled by total
assets. KZ index median is defined as 1 for the firms with above median KZ index and 0 otherwise. High default refers to firms with above median
probability of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April 2020-December 2020 and 0 otherwise. Table 1 presents the description of
all the variables. The robust standard errors are displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The significance level at 1%, 5% and
10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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A. Appendix
Figure A1: Payables and net payables distribution
44
Figure A2: Trend of GDP growth rate and TED spread rate
The figure shows the trend of GDP growth rate and TED spread rate for last two decades. COVID-19
refers to infectious coronavirus disease of 2019 and GFC refers to the Global Financial Crisis.
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Figure A3: Parallel trend of debt growth of firms during COVID-19 period
The figure shows the parallel trend of average debt growth of firms for last two years. The firms are
classified as high default and low default based on probability of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for
the period April 2020-December 2020 and 0 otherwise. Debt growth is defined as the logarithm of debt
of current quarter scaled by debt of previous quarter. The description of all variables is presented in
Table 1.
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Table A1: Country-wise distribution of sample
Country ObservationsUnique firmsCountry ObservationsUnique firms
Argentina 86 12 Luxembourg 6 2
Austria 20 2 Malaysia 782 85
Bangladesh 82 7 Mexico 346 31
Belgium 46 4 Monaco 26 3
Bermuda 142 14 Netherlands 10 4
Bosnia & Herzegovina8 3 Nigeria 116 14
Brazil 480 40 Norway 153 24
Bulgaria 44 3 Oman 40 5
Canada 662 64 Pakistan 175 20
Chile 234 25 Peru 117 15
China 11,522 1127 Philippines 218 21
Colombia 58 4 Poland 713 69
Croatia 154 14 Portugal 60 6
Cyprus 30 2 Qatar 10 2
Denmark 150 13 Romania 22 4
Egypt 185 19 Russia 542 49
Estonia 14 2 Saudi Arabia 179 18
Finland 32 2 Singapore 151 21
Germany 1,199 114 Slovenia 14 2
Greece 48 7 Spain 25 5
Hong Kong 4 2 Sri Lanka 384 32
India 3,142 566 Sweden 339 46
Indonesia 2,505 205 Taiwan 6,773 515
Ireland 62 5 Thailand 2,150 172
Italy 40 6 Turkey 827 91
Japan 30,303 2162 Ukraine 8 2
Jordan 118 12 United Kingdom 48 3
Kazakhstan 22 2 United States of America20,076 1485
Lithuania 16 2 Vietnam 2,268 220
Total 87,986 7406
47
Table A2: Impact of COVID-19 on trade credit for emerging markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High default × COVID-19 × Emerging economy dummy 0.053 0.151 0.256 0.058
(0.243) (0.228) (0.320) (0.359)
High default × COVID-19 -0.291*** -0.255** -0.341** -0.325**
(0.110) (0.109) (0.139) (0.137)
High default × Emerging economy dummy 0.030 -0.035 -0.065 -0.169
(0.120) (0.148) (0.165) (0.185)
High default -0.017 -0.075 -0.010 0.006









Constant 8.831*** -7.411*** -3.659*** -1.797
(0.028) (1.870) (0.039) (2.574)
Observations 85,352 68,666 85,352 68,666
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.931 0.943 0.895 0.905
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(2) is payables scaled by total assets and column (3)-
(4) is net payables scaled by total assets. High default refers to firms with above median probability
of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April 2020-December 2020 and 0 otherwise.
Emerging economy dummy is defined as 1 for the firms in emerging economies and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors are displayed in
brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted
by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table A3: Regression results using subsample (without US and Japan)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
High default × COVID-19 -0.248** -0.414*** -0.167 -1.666** -1.415 -0.092 -0.335 0.710** -2.414* -0.935
(0.124) (0.143) (0.194) (0.833) (0.931) (0.176) (0.204) (0.318) (1.348) (1.503)
High default × COVID-19 × Sales growth median 0.257* 0.534***
(0.143) (0.179)
High default × COVID-19 × Manufacturing dummy -0.135 -1.346***
(0.250) (0.372)
High default × COVID-19 × ESG score 0.041** 0.060**
(0.018) (0.029)
High default × COVID-19 × Social score 0.034* 0.023
(0.019) (0.027)
Firm-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,573 34,052 41,573 12,532 12,532 41,573 34,052 41,573 12,532 12,532
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.926 0.921 0.964 0.964 0.893 0.899 0.893 0.941 0.941
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(5) is payables scaled by total assets and column (6)-(10) is net payables scaled by total assets. High
default is defined as 1 for firms with above median probability of default. COVID-19 is defined as 1 for the period April 2020-December 2020
and 0 otherwise. Sales growth median is defined as 1 for the firms with above median sales growth and 0 otherwise. Manufacturing dummy is
defined as 1 for firms in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. ESG score refers to the overall score of a firm based on environmental, social
and corporate governance scores. Social score refers to a firm’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society.
Table 1 presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors are displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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Table A4: Placebo estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
High default × Placebo 0.118 0.157 -0.088 -0.451 -0.985*** 0.587 0.747 -0.098 -0.462 -1.059***
(0.108) (0.112) (0.143) (0.373) (0.381) (0.501) (0.506) (0.143) (0.377) (0.384)
High default × Placebo × Sales growth median -0.091 -0.160
(0.123) (0.166)
High default × Placebo × Manufacturing dummy 0.348* 1.161
(0.210) (0.886)
High default × Placebo × ESG score 0.015 0.015
(0.011) (0.011)
High default × Placebo × Social score 0.027** 0.028**
(0.011) (0.011)
Firm-level control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101,962 100,689 101,962 13,758 13,758 101,628 100,414 101,628 13,710 13,710
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Industry-Year Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.927 0.929 0.927 0.978 0.978 0.806 0.818 0.806 0.975 0.975
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(5) is payables scaled by total assets and column (6)-(10) is net payables scaled by total assets.
High default is defined as 1 for firms with above median probability of default. Placebo refers to an artificially induced crisis period and is
defined as 1 for the period April 2016-December 2016 and 0 otherwise. Sales growth median is defined as 1 for the firms with above median
sales growth and 0 otherwise. Manufacturing dummy is defined as 1 for firms in the manufacturing industry and 0 otherwise. ESG score refers
to the overall score of a firm based on environmental, social and corporate governance scores. Social score refers to a firm’s capacity to generate
trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society. Table 1 presents the description of all the variables. The robust standard errors
are displayed in brackets which are clustered at the firm level. The significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
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